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ABSTRACT 
 
We investigate the effect of changes in capital regulation on the strictness 
(leniency) of loan terms using a simple model of bank capital requirements and 
asset quality examinations.  Banks offer different levels of “leniency” in the sense 
of willingness to offer automatic extensions of loans in the presence of temporary 
payment difficulties of borrowers.  Banks offering lenient (less strict) loan terms 
must have higher initial levels of capital and charge higher loan rates.  When 
capital requirements are increased, both strict and lenient banks hold higher levels 
of initial capital and they raise loan rates. As capital requirements increase the 
difference between initial capital levels and between interest rates of strict and 
lenient banks decrease. Thus, higher capital requirements in recessions tend to 
reduce the interest rate premium paid for leniency. If a recession is interpreted as 
an increase in the required return, the interest rate premium paid for leniency is 
increased in recession at a given level of required capital. 
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Capital Requirements and Banks’ Leniency 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper focuses on the effect of bank capital regulation and its enforcement on 
the supply of credit with more or less strictness in bank enforcement of loan repayment 
terms.  A strict bank lends for one period and enforces the loan contract at the end of the 
period.  Lenient banks may extend the loan period for projects in need of liquidity in the 
sense that the projects’ cash flows at the end of the first loan period are insufficient to 
repay the loan although the project remains economically solvent. Leniency is affected by 
three aspects of the capital regulation that currently are of great policy interest: the level of 
capital requirements; their enforcement through asset quality examinations; and the 
classification policy for loans as non-performing.  The three regulatory initiatives are 
mutually connected, since when loans are “classified” as non-performing by regulators, the 
book value of the bank’s assets and, hence, measured capital are reduced. The bank may 
have to add to its loan loss reserves when asset values fall when the bank’s assets are 
examined.  We analyze how these aspects of capital regulation affect the supply of strict 
and lenient lending and focus on the effects of capital regulation by keeping the information 
structure very simple and exogenous: effort and monitoring are exogenous. Nevertheless, 
the three aspects of capital regulation jointly affect banks’ incentives to offer strict one 
period contracts relative to more lenient contracts.  
            The model we develop stylizes the examination process for capital requirements by 
assuming that assets are examined one period after loan and capital decisions are made by  
bank managers. This assumption captures the time lag between loan decisions and 
examinations. At the time of examination the bank has obtained additional information 
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about its loan projects. Borrowers have either succeeded or failed to repay. In the latter 
case, all projects are liquidated if the bank is strict, or loans are renewed if the bank is 
lenient and if the projects are expected to succeed after another period. In both cases 
capital is measured to reflect banks realized and unrealized losses on loans.  Banks realize 
their loan losses by liquidating projects and reducing assets by the loss on project 
liquidation. Renewal of loans for one more period may take place when  projects’ second 
period expected returns are such that the loan has a higher value than its liquidation value, 
and if banks have sufficient measured  capital taking into account unrealized losses.   
 At the time loans are made a bank’s actual capital can differ from required capital 
without penalty, but at the time of examination the bank must have the regulatory minimum 
capital to continue in operation.  In practice, of course, most banks have capital such that 
minor unexpected variations in earnings and/or loan quality can be absorbed, and 
examinations cannot be timed precisely as is assumed here.  Nevertheless, the fact that 
examinations cannot take place continuously implies that banks can keep less capital than 
formally required at the time loans are made.  The model makes clear how minimum 
capital requirements and loan quality examinations affect bank loan pricing and the 
willingness of some banks to work out loans by continuing rather than liquidating projects.  
           Thakor and Wilson (1995) examine bank capital requirements within a multi-period 
model of projects that succeed or fail after one period.  If projects fail, they may pay off 
after one more period, similar to the projects in this paper.  However, in Thakor and 
Wilson successful first-period projects become risk-free in periods two and three, while 
successful projects in our model are terminated  (loans are paid off and new-one period 
loans are extended).  They are analyzing project managers’ multi-period financing choices 
and include competitive sources of funds from banks and capital markets, where we focus 
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on bank loans with two possible loan terms (strict and lenient) that must provide the same 
return for the banks although they require different levels of initial capital.  
         Multi-period lending makes signaling of heterogeneous types of borrowers possible. 
In Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) credit rationing is affected by multi-period contracting. Such 
contracting can mitigate adverse selection problems as discussed in detail in Webb (1991). 
Moral hazard aspects are explored in Boot and Thakor (1994), who consider multiperiod 
contracts with endogenous effort. Although we do not focus explicitly on the mitigation of 
asymmetric information problems, multiperiod contracting in our model extends the supply 
of credit to a group of borrowers who could be cut off from credit as a result of capital 
regulation. 
Deposit insurance or other bank liability guarantees require bank examination and 
limitations on investment authorities and capital standards to control the principal-agent 
problem inherent in shifting the risk of liabilities to the government or monetary authorities.  
Capital regulation has evolved over a tortuous history in the United States (see Vojta 
(1973) for a classic study of bank capital needs or Dietrich (1996) or Berger et al (1995) 
for surveys of capital regulation standards). 
 Global interest in capital regulation has intensified with capital and banking market 
integration in recent decades.  The Cooke Committee working with the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) in 1988 worked out the so called Basel capital standards 
that have been adopted by most developed economies as a standard. The Basel approach is 
to assess minimum capital requirements as a ratio of risk-weighted assets, where the risk 
weights are determined by perceived credit risk of different but broad classes of loans. A 
new round of negotiations for revised capital regulation is now being conducted through 
the BIS framework with the new capital standards, the so-called Basel II capital 
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requirements, scheduled for implementation by Group of 10 and other countries by 20061. 
It is expected that Basel II will allow some banks to use internal risk ratings as a basis for 
the risk weights for different assets. It is not clear how these regulatory changes will affect 
the enforcement mechanism though examinations of assets. We return to this issue in the 
concluding section. 
 Capital regulation is controversial and changes in capital regulation or the 
strictness of the enforcement of capital requirements are debated actively.  For example, in 
1981, the face of earnings problems and increasing interest rates , capital requirements for 
thrifts in the United States were lowered from 6 to 3 percent of assets.  With the adoption of 
the Basel capital standards and stricter enforcement of standards, asset quality, and closure 
rules in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) 
(1989) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) (1991), 
stricter capital standards were applied to all deposit-taking institutions and regulatory 
forbearance of capital standards sharply circumscribed. 
 Substantial controversy surrounds the economic benefits of these changes in capital 
requirements and the strictness of capital regulation over the business cycle.  Easing 
standards during the recession in the United States in the early 1980’s was advocated as a 
way to allow deposit-taking thrift institutions to survive a temporary crisis.  Restricting 
standards later in the decade was viewed as a necessary change to avoid future crises.  
However, increasing capital standards in the early 1990’s was blamed for a drying up of 
bank credit, causing a so-called “credit crunch” and possibly exacerbating the recession of 
1990 to 1992 in the United States.  On the other hand, observers of banks in Asia, mainly 
                                                
1 See Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 2003, for the planned revisions of the 1988 capital 
standards. 
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Japan and China, argue that lax asset quality review and loss provisioning have prolonged 
their economic recoveries or inhibited growth in the late 1990’s. Although we discuss 
cyclical implications of capital requirements, the focus of this paper is on the loan rate 
implications of rigid capital enforcement and asset quality review. 
The need for capital regulation suggests that banks attempt to minimize capital.  
Many banks, however, have capital well above minimum capital requirements.  For 
example, Brinkman and Horvitz (1995) document that many banks had capital levels well 
above regulatory requirements in 1990 even before the higher requirements were 
implemented.  In general, many smaller banks have capital that exceeds regulatory 
guidelines.  The model in this paper help explain why banks may have differing loan 
market strategies such that some banks prefer more capital than others given minimum 
required capital levels. 
 The relation between capital standards and liquidity has not been examined 
extensively. It is important to define what is meant by liquidity in this context.  For 
example, Kashyap et al (2002) define liquidity in terms of making cash available to 
borrowers or depositors when needed on demand through demand deposit withdrawals or 
takedowns on loan commitments. The demand for liquidity can also be interpreted as the 
need for cash to make contractual payments but where the inability to realize the full value 
of assets through sale in the short term makes covering the cash needs costly.  If payment 
can be delayed with the expectation of higher asset values in the future because the 
counterparty is willing to wait, the counterparty provides liquidity by not requiring the 
costly liquidation of assets.  In this sense greater leniency of banks towards borrowers 
with temporary payment difficulties can be thought of as an increase in the supply of 
liquidity. Dietrich (2003) develops a model of capital regulation and its relation to lending 
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which is applied in this study to the effects of changes on capital requirements on the 
provision of leniency. We analyze the relation between the loan rates banks must charge for 
leniency in lending under capital regulation. 
             The model presented in the paper does not allow for an analysis of the macro-
economic trade-offs in capital regulation.  Some previous analyses have touched on these 
issues in terms of socially optimal amounts of banks capital (e.g. Koehn and Santomero 
(1980)), but have not considered the effect of capital on liquidity in the sense of leniency in 
loan policy as discussed here. 
             In Section 2 the market for loans is characterized with the purpose of analyzing the 
effect of minimum capital requirements on lending policy. In the model borrowers differ in 
their willingness to pay for leniency, defined in line with the previous discussion as a 
willingness of a bank to not call a loan when projects do not pay off as quickly as hoped. 
We introduce minimum capital requirements on assets net of loan losses. These 
requirements are not continuously enforced and the banks adjust initial capital accordingly 
when loans are made.  In Section 3 we solve numerically for the initial capital of strict and 
lenient banks, and the cost of extending lenient loans at different levels of required capital.. 
The numerical solution provides the basis for a discussion of cyclical effects of capital 
requirements and counter-cyclical policy in Section 4. In the concluding Section 5 we 
return to potential implications of Basel II. 
2.  A Model of Bank Optimal Capital with Two Types of Borrowers 
 It is assumed that there are two types of borrowers and that banks cannot 
distinguish between them ex ante.  Banks can offer two types of loan contacts: a one-period 
(strict) loan with non-recourse by the lender to the borrower’s assets beyond the project, 
and a (lenient) loan that is renewable for solvent  but illiquid borrowers at the end of 
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period one.  All borrowers use 100 percent bank financing to invest in projects that pay a 
R1 percent return on the investment in one period with probability (1-q) and the payoffs 
from the project are pledged to the bank.  Risk in the model consists of the assumption that 
a fraction q of projects do not pay off after one period.  However, some of the failed first-
period projects may have economically viable payoffs in the second period as discussed 
below.  Projects unsuccessful after one period can be liquidated by the lender for (1 - w) 
percent of the amount financed by the bank.   
        Neither borrowers nor lenders can determine which projects will pay off in one 
period at the time loans are made. However, they know whether a project that cannot pay 
back after one period has a high or low probability of paying back after two periods. If 
projects that do not pay off in the first period are allowed to continue for a second period 
they pay off either R21 or R22 percent, where R22 ³ R21, at the end of the second period of the 
investment.  The probability of the high payoff for failed first-period projects in the second 
period is (1-p).  The probabilities (q and p) as well as the possible returns R1, w, R22, and 
R21 in both periods are known when projects are initiated.  
        We want to derive the borrowers willingness to pay interest on strict one-period – 
and lenient renewable loans. Given the above, expected borrower-investor's return, 
E(R1B), for one-period loans is given by: 
 ))(1()( 11
1
LB rRqRE --=  ( 1) 
where r1L is the loan rate on non-renewable one period loans. Borrowers contracting for 
two-period loans with lenders who do not call loans after one period, allowing projects to 
go one more period, have an expected return as follows: 
 )]2()2)(1[())(1()( 221
2
22
2
1
2
LLLB rRprRpqrRqRE -+--+--=  ( 2) 
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where r2L denotes the 2-period interest rate on the loan and E(R
2
B) is the expected 2-period 
return for the borrower.   A third possibility would be that a renewable loan is offered at 
one rate for the first period, and a different rate is offered for the second period if needed. 
This possibility is not considered further because it is the total interest payments over the 
two periods that matter for the borrower, and we will see below that the renewable first 
period loan rate charged by the bank must be higher than the strict bank’s one period rate.  
We assume in our examples below that p and R21 are such that two-period borrowers 
default on the loan with the lower payoff, and that the bank liquidates the project in period 
two receiving 1+ R21. Thereby equation (2) is simplified by dropping the final term. 
          Depending on expected returns in the two periods and loan rates there are borrowers 
who will prefer lenient loan conditions: 
E[R2B] > E[R
1
B] if  q(1-p)(R22 – 2r
2
L) > (1-q)(r
2
L –r
1
L) +qp2r
2
L       (3) 
 Borrowers with expected returns in the good state in excess of the two-period 
(lenient) loan rate are willing to pay a premium for renewable loans.  The loan market 
equilibrium will be characterized by borrowers willing to pay different loan rates if some 
banks can make economic returns by offering renewable loans at higher rates than one-
period loans.   Clearly, if there are banks that can earn a sufficient return on renewable 
loans by charging a premium, more projects will be financed than if only one period loans 
are supplied. As equation (3) shows, some borrowers will be willing to pay lenders a 
higher rate of interest on loans to guarantee that loans will not be called and liquidated 
after one period. With a high enough probability (1-p) and high enough payoffs R22 some 
investor-borrowers would be willing to pay a higher loan rate to assure the completion of 
the project if it should not pay off after one period.  For example, if R1 = 40 percent, R22 = 
40 percent, assuming the outcome R21 has a 0 percent return to the borrower, with q = .1 
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and p = .5, a loan rate rL of 8.89 percent from the strict lender provides the same expected 
return (28 percent) to the investor as a 10 percent rate from the lenient lender.  The rate 
differential of 1.11% in the example is a leniency premium on a loan with the option to be 
renewed at the same terms after one period.  
 We are interested in the effect of capital requirements on the ability of lenders to 
carry borrowers whose projects have not paid off after one period for one more period.  
Bank lenders committed to financing projects for up to two periods will be holding non-
performing loans after one period subject to mandatory write-downs or additions to 
reserves required by regulators.  These write-downs or additions to reserves reduce 
regulatory capital 
 Bank capital regulation is assumed to require a minimum amount of capital as a 
ratio to total assets, k * , at the time loan portfolio quality is reviewed by regulators.  
Between examinations, banks may be above or below the required capital level but banks 
plan to meet their minimum capital at the time of examination.  Banks finance the loans they 
make at period t, Lt  in part with an infinitely elastic supply of deposits, Dt , at a fixed 
interest cost of rD , and beginning-of-period capital Kt such that: 
L D K and K k Lt t t t t t= + =  (4) 
Bank managers' lending and leverage decisions at the beginning of the period then are 
summarized for period t: 
 t
t
tL =
1
k
K  (5) 
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where kt represents bank management's choice of leverage at the beginning of the first 
period and, while capital will satisfy regulatory requirements when the bank is reviewed, 
initial capital can be *kk t ³£ . 
 In the following discussion, we will identify with the superscript s capital and 
loans from lenders that are  "strict" with respect to loan terms in that if the project does not 
pay off after one period, the lender calls the loan and liquidates the project.  The 
superscript l indicates that the lender is "lenient" and carries the borrower for one more 
period at the loan's original interest rate, allowing the borrower to realize the second 
period investment return R21 or R22. 
             Given the risk characteristics described above, q percent of loan customers have 
payment difficulties after one period.  Loan examiners qualify these loans as problem 
loans.  Lenders following the strict policy call the loans, reducing their banks' income by 
the following Provision for Loan Losses2: 
 t tPLL = qw L  (6) 
Where w is the loss in asset value relative to the original investment when the project is 
liquidated. The strict loan strategy implies a change in equity capital for banks following 
that strategy for its entire portfolio of loans as follows: 
 D ts t L t t DK = (1- q) L r - qwL - D r  (7) 
The rate of return on equity invested in period t for strict banks, rst, can be expressed in 
terms of the above-defined variables 
 t
s t
s
t t
L
t
t
D
t
= K
K
=
1
k
(1-q)r -
(1- k )
k
r -qw
1
k
r
D
 (8) 
                                                
2 See Walter (1991) for a discussion of the practice in the United States.  
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Given the above, the strict lender's end-of-period measured capital ratio, kt+1
m,s, is given 
by: 
 t+1m s
t t
s
t
t t
s
t t
t
t
*k =
K (1+ ( k ))
K (1+ ( k ))+ K
(1 - k )
k
k,
r
r
³  (9) 
where the second term in the denominator equals Dt and k
* is the required capital ratio. In 
equation (9), rts is a function of the initial capital ratio kt.  Using (9), the following relation 
between the return maximizing initial capital (producing the minimum measured capital at 
the end of the period) and the minimum required capital can be derived: 
t t t
s
t
* *
t t
s
tk + k ( k )= k + k k ( k )r r  (10) 
where k* is the regulatory minimum capital ratio from above.  Using equations (8) and (10) 
and simplifying, we obtain the initial capital ratio producing maximum returns following 
the strict loan policy: 
 ts
* *
L D
*
D
*k = k
-(1- k )((1-q)r - r -qw)
1+(1- k )r
k£  (11) 
The beginning-of-period capital for the strict lender is shown in the second column of 
Table 1 for various levels or regulatory capital shown in the first column and for different 
interest rates in the three panels, given parameter values shown at the bottom of the table.  
The table also shows also the rate of return for the strict lender in the third column.  For 
example, at a regulatory measured capital requirement of 5% and a loan rate of 11%, the 
strict bank begins the period with capital 4.69% of assets and earns 6.87% net of losses on 
that investment3. 
                                                
3 Write-offs are assumed equal to actual losses in the example. 
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          In these expressions the initial capital is derived under the assumption that bank 
examinations take place at the end of each loan period. This assumption is obviously not 
entirely realistic since banks extend loans more or less continuously between examinations. 
The assumption tends to exaggerate the average difference between the initial capital and 
the required capital at the time of examinations but it captures the ability of banks to plan 
their capital ratio based on regulators’ policies with respect to examinations, which are 
costly and therefore infrequent.  
 Lenient banks are assumed not to call loans to borrowers whose projects do not 
pay off in period 1.  Regulators require the lenient banks write off the entire amount of the 
loans on unsuccessful projects that appear to be non-performing by regulatory definitions.   
A fraction (1 - p) of these loans will be successful in the second period, and the remainder 
will be liquidated by the bank at the low return, R12 (= 0 here) at the end of the second 
period.  In order to compare returns for strict and lenient banks we must make an 
assumption about the lenient banks’ use of the funds obtained from projects that are 
successful after one period. It is assumed that the banks issue (strict) one-period loans for 
the second period at the one period interest rate. Alternatively we could solve for a steady 
state solution with overlapping lenient loans. 4. In this model all bank assets are liquidated 
at the end of the second period, and two-period projects that are unsuccessful at the end of 
second period are liquidated at 1+R21 times the loan amount   
          The measured return on capital of lenient banks for the first period after accounting 
for write-downs required by regulators can be written:  
 t
l t
t t
L t D=
K
K
=
1
k
((1- q)r -(1 - k )r - q)r
D
 (12) 
                                                
4  Dietrich (2003) provides steady state solutions in such a model using a variety of assumptions for 
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In this case the q term is only a recognized loss, not a realized loss.  In analogy with strict 
banks we can express the measured end-of-period capital ratio for the lenient bank, kt+1m,l, 
using expression (9), but substituting superscripts l for superscripts s. Inserting (12) into the 
expression, the required beginning of period capital ratio for the lenient bank can be 
derived: 
 
D
DLl
t rk
qrrqkk
k
)1(1
))1)((1(
*
2**
-+
-----
=  (13) 
As can easily be seen by comparing the above to the beginning capital for strict banks in 
expression (10), the initial capital for lenient banks is larger than or equal to initial capital 
for strict banks, because the asset write-off for the non performing loan is smaller for the 
strict bank recovering a fraction w of the loan..  Thus, 
 t
l
t
sk k³  (14) 
meaning that lenient banks in the two period analysis always have higher capital ratios than 
strict banks. 
 The lenient strategy only makes sense for banks if this strategy earns the same or a 
higher return than a strict policy over the two periods5.  The average two period return 
with the lenient policy is: 
 
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
+
+
= +
l
tl
t
t
l
tl
k
qk
12
1 r
r
r , (15) 
reflecting the fact that unrealized losses do not determine the bank’s real return.  Under our 
simple assumptions, the second period return consists of net earnings on non-performing 
                                                                                                                                              
model parameters. The solution is more complicated than is useful in this discussion. 
5 The examples below do not compound interest to keep the analysis as simple as possible.  Clearly 
compounding could be incorporated and would not change the results. 
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loans from the initial period plus the returns on new one period loans leveraged with the 
minimum regulatory capital and including only realized losses on loans: 
 
l
t
DLt
t
l
k
qwrkrqRp
2
)1()1())1(p)2r-q((1qk *112
2
L
l
t
l
1
----+++++
=+
r
r , (16) 
where we have expressed the two-period return as a return on first period capital that is 
assumed to be tied up for both periods.  The two-period return from a lenient loan policy 
will be higher than that from the strict policy whenever the returns from holding the loans 
one more period balance the costs of the write-offs from calling loans. 
          Finally, it can be noted that it is not necessary to assume that the lenient bank charges 
the same rate for the two periods. It could have charged a first period rate taking into 
account that some loans must be written off as non-performing, and a second period rate 
based on the elements of the second period return in expression (16). The first period 
interest rate would have to be higher than the strict bank’s interest rate in this case as well. 
Thus, borrowers would self-select strict and lenient loans based on expected returns in the 
two periods as in the case we have analyzed. 
3. Numerical solution for capital and the cost of leniency 
 The last two columns of Table 1 provide values for the lenient lender’s beginning-
of-period capital and its rate of return using the same assumptions as for the strict lender. 
In all cases below the deposit interest rate is 9%, the probability of non-performance of the 
projects in period 1 (q) is .1, the probability of the bad state in the second period for 
renewed loans (p) is .8, the return on the project in the bad state in the second period is 
negative 100%, and the loss in asset value at liquidation after one period is 10% (w = .1). 
As can be seen from the table, the lenient lender must always have higher capital than the 
strict lender for the loan. In fact, initial capital is higher than regulatory minimums in order 
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to absorb loan loss provisions as required by examiners. For future reference we note that 
the difference in initial capital, as well as the differences in returns, decline as required 
capital increases. 
            As demonstrated in the previous sections, higher levels of required capital or 
stricter enforcement of capital requirements changes the returns to strict and lenient banks 
and changes the difference in loan rates necessary to induce banks to be lenient.  Providers 
of leniency must be compensated to be willing to wait for a turnaround in temporarily 
distressed assets.  In this section, we examine changes in the level of required capital on 
the cost of liquidity reflected in the differential between one-period and two-period 
renewable loans. In order to make meaningful comparisons between the two types of banks 
and to assure that there is a supply of both types of loans, we assume that both types of 
banks set initial capital and loan rates with the same objective in terms of required return 
on initial capital.  
 Table 2 shows the initial capital ratios for strict and lenient banks that produce 
returns on bank capital of 20%.  As before, strict banks always have initial capital less 
than the required capital at the time of examinations, while lenient banks have more capital 
in order to absorb loan write-offs.  At a required level of .05 (5 percent) of assets in 
capital at the time of bank examination, strict lenders have initial capital of .0412, while 
lenient lenders require .227.  As capital standards are increased, initial capital levels 
increase.  Figure 1 illustrates the effects of increasing required capital on initial capital 
needs for strict and lenient lenders earning a 20% return using the numbers in Table 2.  For 
example, at required capital of .20 of assets, strict banks’ initial capital has quadrupled as 
a percent of assets to .1701, while lenient banks’ capital increases relatively less to .338 
of assets.  The increase in initial capital as a percent of assets is 13% for strict banks (i.e. 
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from .0412 to .1701), while capital needs for lenient lenders increase by 11 percent of 
assets.6 
 Table 2 shows also the loan rates required to produce the 20% return on invested 
capital.  At a required capital of .05 of assets, strict lenders require 16.07% average loan 
rate while lenient lenders will need 17.71% to cover their loan losses and carry non-
performing loans one more period.  The difference of 1.64% or 164 basis points represents 
a “leniency” premium; a charge by lenders for their willingness to carry loans one more 
period in this model.  Figure 2 illustrates the relation between the level of loan rates 
producing a return on capital of 20% and required capital.  The figure illustrates how, as 
required capital increases, the spread between rates required by strict and lenient lenders 
narrows with higher capital requirements, becoming approximately equal at around 20% of 
assets.  
               The return of the strict bank is generated by the interest rate spread between the 
loan rate and the deposit rate more than compensating for the decline in the asset value in 
the first period on a fraction (1-q) of the loans. For the lenient bank to earn a return on 
capital the interest rate spread must more than compensate for a greater (total) loss on a 
small fraction (1-q)(1-p) of its loans.  
               The declining leniency premium as capital requirements increase is partly 
explained by the observation above that the differences in initial capital declines as 
required capital increases.  In Table 2, the loan rate is endogenous. The lenient bank holds 
a much larger initial capital ratio even at a very low required capital ratio in order to be 
able to write down asset values 100 percent on non-performing loans in the first period. 
                                                
6 For near-zero levels of required capital the strict bank is unable to plan initial capital levels relative to 
the time of supervisory review, assuming that the capital ratio cannot be negative. 
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When required capital increases the impact on the initial capital of the strict bank is larger 
than the impact on the initial capital of the lenient bank. Therefore, the greater the required 
capital ratio the smaller is the required increase in the interest rate spread to earn the 
required return on an additional unit of capital.7  
 4. Cyclical Aspects of Capital Regulation 
The evidence on the relation between the enforcement of more stringent capital 
standards, asset quality review, and economic activity and/or bank lending is not clear 
over the business cycle8.  Nonetheless, many credit market observers are convinced that 
stricter enforcement of bank capital standards reduces the supply of credit and liquidity 
during economic slowdowns. Furthermore, bank regulators are likely to increase capital 
requirements or the stringency of capital enforcement, including required write-offs, in bad 
economic conditions when the demand for liquidity is increasing because fewer projects 
are successful in one period.  
 One way of interpreting “more stringent enforcement” is that the supervisors’ 
examinations become more frequent. In the model above, it was assumed that there was a 
one period lag between the beginning of the loan period and the examination. Banks were 
assumed to be able to plan their capital policy with respect to the timing of supervisory 
reviews. Since strict banks are able to hold less than required capital initially, we expect 
these banks to be affected more strongly by more frequent examinations. Thus, the 
stringency would reduce the cost of leniency relative to strictness. Increasing capital 
requirements in recession times would also reduce the relative cost of leniency. On the 
other hand, this increase would put pressure on loan rates at the precise time borrowers 
                                                
7 Disregarding near-zero levels of required capital 
8 See, for example, Berger and Udell (1994) for a review of the evidence and literature on the relation 
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most require forbearance or leniency.  Borrowers assessing long-term prospects to be 
good, that is, that projects will pay off, may not be able to justify project completion at 
higher loan rates.  Abandonment of projects because of increased loan rates could 
exacerbate recession forces at play in the economy, possible delaying recovery. In our 
model, increased capital requirements put upward pressure on interest rates for both strict 
and lenient loans but relatively more for strict loans.  Thus, the cyclical effect of increasing 
capital requirements is ambiguous. 
  To evaluate the cyclicality of the mentioned policy measure, we have calculated 
the minimum return in the good state in period 2 (RMIN22) that induces a borrower to choose 
the lenient bank. Equation (3) is used to estimate RMIN22  using the  parametric values shown 
in Table 2. The column RMIN22
 shows that the minimum return in the good state is declining. 
The explanation for this result is that the difference between the one and the two period 
loan rates must be compensated for by this return in the second period. The probabilities of 
the good and bad states (see eq. (3)) determine the magnitude of the required good-state 
return in period 2. It can be noted that the same pattern for RMIN22  would be obtained even 
if p, the probability of the bad state in period 2, is much lower than the .8 in Table 2. This 
high probability of the bad state explains the very high level of  R22
MIN at any level of 
required capital. 
        The implication of this analysis for cyclicality is that a reduction of the difference 
between the one and the two period interest rates (the strict and the lenient lending rates) in 
a recession has a counter cyclical effect even if the two rates increase. Thus, both 
increased frequency of supervisory reviews and increased capital requirements in 
recessions tend to have counter cyclical effects.  
                                                                                                                                              
between the new Basel capital standards and credit availability during the recession of 1990 to 1992.  
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     We may interpret a recession as an increase in investors’ required returns on capital to 
compensate for higher economic risks, including bank investors.  Figure 3 illustrates the 
impact of changing the required return on bank capital from 20% to 25% on the levels of 
loan rates for strict and lenient lenders at different levels of required capital.  The figure 
demonstrates that the effect on loan rates of changes in required returns is not as great for 
strict as for lenient lenders. With this interpretation of recession forces, the leniency 
premium increases during recessions. This increase in the premium would have a pro-
cyclical effect for reasons discussed above. However, this pro-cyclical effect could be 
offset by the increased stringency of capital requirements, since such an increase would 
reduce the premium. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 Banks subject to capital regulation and loan quality review must anticipate that 
some borrowers will experience difficulties in repaying loans in the short run.  Banks 
wishing to accommodate borrowers who have good long-run prospects no matter what 
happens in the short run must invest more capital in order to absorb write-offs required by 
capital regulation.  Because of their higher capital investments and loan losses, lenient 
lenders providing a kind of liquidity service must charge higher loan rates to earn the same 
returns as lenders not providing these services. 
 The numerical solution of the model demonstrated that strict and lenient banks’ loan 
interest rates increase with higher capital requirements. In this sense, the cost of leniency 
increases with the required capital ratio. On the other hand, the premium on lenient loan 
rates relative to strict loan rates is reduced with the consequence that the required return in 
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the second period of the lenient loan falls. For this reason, higher capital requirements, as 
well as more frequent loan reviews cause a shift of loan demand in favor of lenient banks. 
       It was also shown that if a recession is interpreted as an increase in the required return 
on capital, then the impact of the recession is to increase the loan rates, as well as the 
leniency premium at a time when leniency would reduce the impact of the recession. In this 
sense, capital requirements are pro-cyclical, but this pro-cyclicality weakens when capital 
requirements are increased.  
            Another controversy in bank capital regulation concerns the effects of different 
capital requirements on different types of loans. The results can also be interpreted in 
terms of differential capital requirements on different classes of assets.  If some projects 
are likely to require more time to be completed but are classified as riskier for purposes of 
capital regulation and result in interim write-offs due to not being successful within a 
regulatory mandated time frame, the model demonstrates that these projects will have 
higher costs of funds.  This opens the possibility that regulatory classification of asset risk 
could have implications for the types of assets banks finance that go beyond simply the 
one-period probability of success. 
          The revised capital requirements being discussed for implementation as part of the 
Basel II capital requirement revisions will increase the number of bank asset risk 
categories to account for differences in perceived credit risk for loans of different types. 
For example, loans to business may have asset risk weights between .5 and 1.5 of the loan 
amounts9.  Furthermore, “sophisticated” banks will be able to use internal risk ratings to 
determine risk weights. The importance of different capital requirements for different types 
of loans could be a very significant factor determining the amounts and terms at which 
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credit is available for different sectors of an economy. If, for example, the risk weighting 
on loans with high short term risk but lower long term risk would be reduced, the cost of 
providing leniency would also be reduced. 
      Basel II does not address the main source of the problem associated with providing 
leniency identified in this paper. That source is the required write down of asset values on 
loans that are non-performing in a period although they may have good prospects in the 
longer term. This problem is aggravated by the ability of banks to plan capital ratios with 
respect to the timing of examinations of the loan portfolios. 
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Table 1 
 
Capital Requirements, Measured Capital, and Returns 
of Strict and Lenient Lenders At Three Loan Rates* 
rL = 11%         
0.05 0.0469 6.87% 0.1257 12.90% 
0.06 0.0562 7.22% 0.1342 12.30% 
0.07 0.0655 7.47% 0.1427 11.90% 
0.08 0.0747 7.66% 0.1512 11.50% 
0.09 0.0840 7.81% 0.1597 11.10% 
0.10 0.0933 7.93% 0.1683 10.70% 
0.11 0.1027 8.03% 0.1768 10.40% 
0.12 0.1120 8.11% 0.1854 10.20% 
0.13 0.1214 8.18% 0.1940 9.90% 
0.14 0.1307 8.24% 0.2026 9.70% 
0.15 0.1401 8.29% 0.2112 9.50% 
0.50 0.4789 8.79% 0.5220 6.50% 
rL  = 14%       
0.05 0.0233 120.55% 0.102 29.60% 
0.06 0.0328 88.30% 0.111 27.70% 
0.07 0.0423 70.49% 0.120 26.00% 
0.08 0.0518 59.20% 0.128 24.50% 
0.09 0.0613 51.40% 0.137 23.20% 
0.10 0.0709 45.69% 0.146 22.10% 
0.11 0.0804 41.33% 0.155 21.10% 
0.12 0.0900 37.89% 0.163 20.20% 
0.13 0.0996 35.11% 0.172 19.40% 
0.14 0.1092 32.81% 0.181 18.70% 
0.15 0.1188 30.88% 0.190 18.00% 
0.50 0.4660 14.58% 0.509 9.50% 
rL  = 17%       
0.05 0.0154 235.82% 0.094 37.10% 
0.06 0.0250 149.08% 0.103 34.30% 
0.07 0.0346 110.28% 0.112 32.00% 
0.08 0.0441 88.28% 0.121 30.00% 
0.09 0.0537 74.12% 0.129 28.20% 
0.10 0.0634 64.23% 0.138 26.70% 
0.11 0.0730 56.94% 0.147 25.40% 
0.12 0.0827 51.35% 0.156 24.20% 
0.13 0.0923 46.91% 0.165 23.10% 
0.14 0.1020 43.31% 0.174 22.20% 
0.15 0.1117 40.33% 0.183 21.30% 
0.50 0.4617 16.58% 0.505 10.60% 
                          
Parameter values: rD = 9%, q = .1, w = .1, p = .8, R12 = -100% 
 
           k*        k,s        r  s     k,l r  l 
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Table 2 
                            Capital Ratios and Loan Rates Yielding 20% Return 
 
k* ks     rsL           kl rlL RMIN22 
0.05 0.0412 16.07% 0.227 17.71% 250.9 
0.06 0.0496 16.21% 0.235 17.74% 246.3 
0.07 0.0580 16.36% 0.242 17.77% 241.2 
0.08 0.0664 16.51% 0.249 17.80% 236.1 
0.09 0.0749 16.65% 0.257 17.83% 231.4 
0.10 0.0833 16.80% 0.264 17.86% 226.3 
0.11 0.0919 16.95% 0.271 17.90% 221.8 
0.12 0.1004 17.09% 0.279 17.93% 216.2 
0.13 0.1090 17.24% 0.286 17.97% 212.6 
0.14 0.1176 17.39% 0.294 18.00% 207.5 
0.15 0.1263 17.53% 0.301 18.04% 203.4 
0.16 0.1350 17.68% 0.308 18.07% 198.3 
0.17 0.1437 17.83% 0.316 18.11% 193.7 
0.18 0.1525 17.97% 0.323 18.15% 189.6 
0.19 0.1613 18.12% 0.331 18.18% 184.5 
0.20 0.1701 18.27% 0.338 18.22% 179.7 
Parameter values: rD = 9%, q = .1, w = .1, p = .8, R12 = -100 
                        The column RMIN22 shows the minimum required return in the good state   in 
period 2 for borrowers to prefer the lenient bank.  
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3    
 
Change in Rates with Increase in Required Return from 20 to 25%
15,0%
16,0%
17,0%
18,0%
19,0%
20,0%
21,0%
0,05 0,07 0,09 0,11 0,13 0,15 0,17 0,19
Required Capital
Lo
an
 R
at
es
rL-s rL-l rL-s rL-l
rL
S(20%)
rL
l(20%
)
rL
S(25%)
    
 
 
